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Equal Protection for Illegitimate Children: A
Consistent Rule Emerges
In Trimble u. Gordon,' the Supreme Court struck down a
section of the Illinois Probate Acta that allowed illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession from only their mothers.
Many observers felt the Trimble opinion resolved the confusion
over the standard of equal protection analysis applicable to
cases involving classifications based on legitimacy.' The general
consensus among observers was that "the test applied by the
Trimble Court is remarkably close to strictest scrutiny, for it
would be difficult to imagine a more exacting analysis of the relationship between statutory purposes and legislative means
than the one engaged in by the majority."' One commentator
proposed that "the Trimble decision clearly justifies a general
condemnation of classifications based on legitimacy? Another
predicted that "the momentum amassed since 1968 for equal
treatment should work to erase all distinctions based upon
legitima~y."~
These predictions proved to be inaccurate. Just one year
after deciding Trimble, the Supreme Court upheld two states'
statutes that discriminated on the basis of illegitimacy. In Lalli
1. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
2. Probate Act of 1975 8 2-2, ILL. REV. STAT.ANN.ch. 3, $ 2-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1978) (original version at Probate Act of 1939 § 12, 1939 Ill. Laws 8).
3. "[Tlhe general spirit of Trimble . . . [indicates that] any statute which denies
rights to illegitimates who are able to prove paternity should be stricken." Note, Paternal Inheritance Rights of Illegitimate Children and the Problem of Proving Paternity,
24 WAYNE
L. REV.1389, 1405 (1978). "While the [Trimble] opinion falls short of calling
illegitimacy a suspect category . . . , it implies that the scrutiny which will be applied to
illegitimacy is almost indistinguishable from strict scrutiny." Comment, Paternity Statutes: Thwarting Equal Protection for Illegitimates, 32 U. MIAMIL. REV.339, 365-66
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Paternity Statutes]. "In Trimble, the Court implemented
L. REV.609, 628 (1977). "Therefore, in
the reasonably strict scrutiny test." 11 CREIGHTON
the Court's rejection of the statutory scheme, its analysis approximated strict scrutiny
. . . ." 52 TUL.L. REV.406, 412 (1978).
4. 43 VILL.L. REV.405, 415 (1978).
5. Comment, Constitutional Law: Equal Protection for Illegitimates, 17 WASHBURN
L.J. 392, 399 (1978).
6. Note, Paternal Inheritance Rights of Illegitimate Children and the Problem of
L. REV. 1389, 1408 (1978).
Proving Paternity, 24 WAYNE
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v. Lalli,' the Court sustained a New York law8 prohibiting an
illegitimate child from inheriting from his intestate father unless
the father during his lifetime declared paternity. Similarly, the
Georgia law9 upheld in Parham v. Hughes1° denied the father of
an illegitimate child the right to sue for the wrongful death of
the child unless the father legitimated the child prior to the
child's death."
The statute declared unconstitutional in Trimble was substantively similar to the statute upheld in Lalli.12 By contrast,
the standards of equal protection analysis that were applied
were markedly different. In Trimble the Court maintained that
even " '[tlhough the latitude given state economic and social
regulation is necessarily broad, when state statutory classifications approach sensitive and fundamental personal rights, this
Court exercises a stricter scrutiny . . . .' "I3 The Trimble Court
also required that the statute be " 'carefully tuned to alternative
considerations.' "I4
Compare the Trimble approach with the test used in Lalli:
"[Ilt is not the function of a court 'to hypothesi~eindependently
on the desirability or feasibility of any possible alternative[s]' to
7. 439 US. 259 (1978).
& TRUSTS
LAW$ 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967).
8. N.Y. EST., POWERS
9. GA. CODEANN.$ 105-1307 (1975).
10. 441 US. 347 (1979).
11. The Georgia Code provides that a natural father can legitimate his child merely
by petitioning the superior court in his county to declare paternity. The court then issues
an order declaring the child to be legitimate and capable of inheriting from the father
equally with any children born in lawful wedlock. GA. CODEANN.5 74-103 (1975).
12. The New York law reads in pertinent part:
(1) An illegitimate child . . . and his issue inherit from his mother . . . .
(2) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he
and his issue inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has,
during the lifetime of the father, made an order of filiation declaring paternity
in a proceeding instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or within two
years from the birth of the child.
N.Y. EST., POWERS
& TRUSTSLAW$ 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967).
The relevant part of the Illinois law declares: "An illegitimate child is heir of his
mother . . . . A child who was illegitimate whose parents inter-marry and who is acknowledged by the father as the father's child is legitimate." Probate Act of 1975 § 2-2,
ILL.REV.STAT.ANN.ch. 3, $ 2-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978) (original version at Probate
Act of 1939 $ 12, 1939 Ill. Laws 8).
Although specific requirements differ, both statutes require that in order for illegitimate children to inherit they must be formally legitimated by acts of the parents prior to
the death of the father. See note 88 infra.
13. 430 US. at 767 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 US. 164, 172
(1972)).
14. Id. at 772 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 US. 495, 513 (1976)).
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the statutory scheme . . . ."I6 Instead of the "stricter scrutiny"
applied in Trimble, the Lalli opinion declared that state statutes
regarding illegitimacy must be only "substantially related to the
important state interests the statute is intended to promote."16
This apparent inconsistency is the latest chapter in the Supreme Court's struggle to determine the appropriate constitutional test for statutes dealing with illegitimacy. The lack of a
consistent test is not only philosophically distressing, but on a
practical level, it offers states little guidance in determining
whether their laws are valid. Although Justice Blackmun concurred in the Lalli result, he strongly criticized the plurality
opinion for not providing clear guidance to the states: "[Tlhe
corresponding statutes of other States will be of questionable validity until this Court passes on them, one by one, as being on
the Trimble side of the line or the Labine-Lalli side."17
The Supreme Court opinions dealing with illegitimacy can
be justly criticized for inconsistency; however, the purpose of
this Comment is to propose a rule that accurately explains the
holdings of the illegitimacy cases. Briefly stated, this rule is that
the degree of judicial scrutiny in illegitimacy cases depends on
the legislative purpose for the discrimination. If the statute's
primary purpose is to express society's condemnation of promiscuity, then the statute will be strictly scrutinized and will probably be held unconstitutional. On the other hand, if the discrimination serves a purely administrative purpose, unrelated to
moral condemnation of illegitimacy, the statutory scheme has a
much greater chance of being held constitutional.

The fourteenth amendment provides: "No State shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."18 The drafters of the fourteenth amendment chose to
express the constitutional guarantee of equal protection in broad
terms. The language of the amendment itself does not, for example readily indicate whether illegitimate children can be treated
differently than legitimate children. In fact, the language of the
fourteenth amendment alone does not resolve any of the myriad
15.
16.
17.
18.

439 U.S. at 274 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 US. 495, 515 (1976)).
Id. at 275-76.
Id. at 277 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
U.S. CONST.amend. XIV,$ 1.
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issues that have been raised pursuant to the promise of equality
before the law. In order to give real meaning to the amendment's
promises the courts have had to develop formulas and tests that
define "equal protection" in a way that can be applied to specific
factual situations. By the late 1960's a fairly rigid standard had
evolved.l9
This standard involves a "two-tiered" analysis of the challenged law. The first tier, or the general rule, is that a state statute that discriminates between people or groups of people will
be upheld if there is some rational basis to support the discrimination." The impact of this test is to give the states great deference in fashioning laws-even if such laws treat people unequally-so long as a minimal connection exists between the
purpose of the law and the discrimination.
The second tier consists of two exceptions to the rational
basis test. The rational basis test applies unless the law discriminates on the basis of a "suspect category,"" or unless the law
infringes some "fundamental right."22 Under either exception
19. For a detailed review of equal protection analysis and especially the two-tiered
system, see L. TRIBE,AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW991-1100 (1978). Developments in
this area are reported in Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV.L. REV.1 (1972).
20. The rational basis test has been stated many times by the Supreme Court. One
widely quoted elucidation of this test is from McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961):
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State
legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it.
Id. it 425-26.
21. The Supreme Court has to date declared three categories suspect. See Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (national origin or ancestry). Although
many of the racial discrimination cases also involve discrimination based on national
origin or ancestry, national origin has been declared a suspect classification even in the
absence of racial overtones. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). See also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 1.00 (1943). The classification of alienage as a
suspect category has been weakened by recent cases. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291
(1978); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 US. 677 (1973), the Supreme Court in a plurality
opinion declared sex to be a suspect category. Frontiero has not been followed, however,
and the more recent decisions have firmly rejected, for the time being, classifying sex as
a suspect category. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
22. The Supreme Court has deemed various rights fundamental for equal protection
purposes. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the right to an abortion in the first
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the states are denied the deference afforded them under the rational basis test and strict judicial scrutiny is imposed. This
means that a state has to show more than a r~asonableconnection between the statute's purpose and the challenged discrimination; the state has the burden of proving that the statute
"promote[s] a compelling governmental interest."aa
This two-tiered approach has the advantages of being both
understandable and relatively easy to apply. It can, however, be
criticized for being too rigid? Under the two-tiered approach it
is clear that whether an individual case is won or lost usually
depends on which tier is used. The facts of the case and the
strengths of the parties' interests are important only to the extent that they determine which tier applies. In recent years the
Supreme Court has not adhered to the two-tiered mode of analysis as dogmatically as had been the custom.2s Several observers
have noted the Court's changing approach and have termed the
The
new standard a balancing test or a sliding scale appr~ach.'~
two-tiered analysis was basically an "either-or" approach: either
the statute was strictly scrutinized or it was barely scrutinized.
The balancing test or sliding scale approach, however, facilitates
varying degrees of judicial scrutiny, and therefore allows varying
trimester of pregnancy); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (the right of interstate travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (the right to marry); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (the right to vote); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 US. 479 (1965) (the right of privacy in marital matters); Sherbet v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963) (the free exercise of religion); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (the
right to appeal criminal convictions); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (the
right to procreate).
23. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis in original).
24. Between 1937 and 1970 (roughly from the beginning of the two-tiered approach
until when the approach began to change) the Supreme Court applied the "rational basis" standard to invalidate only one legislative classification. Paternity Statutes, supra
note 3, at 344; see Morey v. Doud, 354 US. 457 (1957). Doud was overruled in New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976).
Only once has the Supreme Court upheld the legislative classification in a case involving strict scrutiny of a suspect category. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944).
25. See Gunther, supra note 20, at 10-20.
26. The most prominent advocate of the "sliding scale" or balancing test approach
is Justice Marshall. He argues not only that the two-tiered approach should be abandoned in favor of a more flexible approach, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 508, 519-21
(1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting), but also contends that the Supreme Court has not in
fact applied a two-tiered analysis in recent years. Justice Marshall persuasively argues
that the Court has applied varying degrees of judicial scrutiny in equal protection cases.
See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 US. 307, 317-22 (1976) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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deference to legislative decisions. The Supreme Court's move
from the rigid two-tiered analysis to a more flexible approach is
amply documented by a review of the illegitimacy cases.

A. An Uncertain Beginning
In Levy u. Louisiana2' and its companion case, Glona v.
American Guarantee & Liability Insurance C O . ,the
~ ~ Supreme
Court for the first time considered discrimination based on illegitimacy as a possible denial of equal protection of the laws. In
Levy five illegitimate children tried to recover for the death of
their mother under the Louisiana wrongful death statute? The
Louisiana courts had construed the word "children" as used in
the statute to exclude illegitimate^.^^ In striking down this law
the Supreme Court did not clearly define what test it applied.
Justice Douglas' majority opinion paid homage to the rational
basis rule," but also cited cases clearly involving the strict scrutiny approachs2 and declared: "We have been extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights . . . ."33 The companion
case, Glona, involved a mother's right under the Louisiana
wrongful death statutes4 to recover for an illegitimate child's
death. As in Levy, Justice Douglas mentioned the rational basis
standard, but the challenged law was summarily declared uncons t i t u t i ~ n a l thus
, ~ ~ creating the impression that the statute was
not afforded traditional rational basis d e f e r e n ~ eConsequently,
.~~
the Court's analysis in Levy and Glona raised doubts as to the
27. 391 U.S. 68 'i1968).
28. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
29. LA. CIV. CODEANN.art. 2315 (West 1979).
30. Levy v. State, 192 So. 2d 193, 195 (La. Ct. App. 1966), cert. denied, 250 La. 25,
193 So. 2d 530 (1967), reu'd, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). See also Glona v. American Guarantee &
Life Ins. Co., 391 U.S. at 74 n.3; Youchian v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 147 La. 1080,86 So. 551
(1920); Buie v. Hester, 147 So. 2d 733 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
31. See 391 U.S. at 71.
32. Id. The cases cited by the Court were Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 669-70 (1966), Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
33. 391 U.S. at 71.
34. LA. CIV.CODEANN.art. 2315 (West 1979).
35. 391 U.S. at 75.
36. See generally Wallach & Tenoso, A Vindication of the Rights of Lrnmarried
Mothers and Their Children: An Analysis of the Institution of Illegitimacy, Equal Protection, and the Uniform Parentage Act, 23 U. KAN.L. REV.23, 43-44 (1974).
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proper equal protection standard to be applied in illegitimacy
cases.
In a dissenting opinion applicable to both Levy and Glona,
Justice Harlan characterized the majority opinions as "constituand contended that the majority reached its
tional curio~ities,"~
conclusion "by a process that can only be described as brute
force."" Justice Harlan observed that wrongful death is a legislatively created cause of action in which the legislature generally
limits those who can recover on "highly arbitrary" grounds.ss
These grounds are usually technical legal distinctions. For example, a man may recover for the death of a wife he did not love
and whom he did not support, but the same man may not recover for the death of his paramour. The legal relationship is
considered a valid distinction here. Justice Harlan argued that
basing recovery on whether a child is legally recognized is just as
"rational" as basing recovery on the biological relationship,
which appears to be what the majority required.'O
Three years after Levy and Glona the dissenters in those
cases found themselves in the majority in a new illegitimacy
case. The Court in Labine v. Vineent41upheld a Louisiana law
that denied unacknowledged illegitimate children the right to inherit under the intestate succession act and limited the right to
recover of even acknowledged illegitimate children." In upholding the statute by applying traditional rational basis analysis,
the Court stated:
[I]t is for [the Louisiana] legislature, not the life-tenured
judges of this Court, to select from among possible laws. We
cannot say that Louisiana's policy provides a perfect or even a
desirable solution or the one we would have provided for the
problem of the property rights of illegitimate children.4s

Justice Black, writing for the majority, tried to distinguish
Labine from Levy by limiting the holdings of Levy to tort
actions.44
37. 391 U.S. at 76 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 77.
40. Id. at 79-80.
41. 401 U.S. 532 (1971). Justice Black wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Blackmun. Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall, dissented.
42. LA. Crv. CODEANN.arts. 919, 202, 206 (West 1952).
43. 401 U.S. at 538-39.
44. Id. at 535-36.
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Justice Brennan's dissent in Labine countered that the majority opinion's "reasoning flies in the face not only of the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also of the very notion of a rule of law."45 The lengthy
dissent compared illegitimacy with national origin, a suspect
category. Justice Brennan contended that illegitimacy and ancestry are things over which people have no control and therefore illegitimacy statutes should be strictly scrutinized in the
same manner as statutes involving national origin.46 Therefore,
he concluded, "[ilt is certainly unusual in this country for a person to be legally disadvantaged on the basis of factors over
which he never had any control."47 Despite the strength of Justice Brennan's argument, it is nevertheless true that the government can and does legally discriminate against people on the basis of facts over which they have no control. Age, for example, is
an unalterable trait that is not classified as a suspect category
even though it is often employed as a basis for dis~rimination.~~
Sex is another unalterable trait that the Supreme Court has refused to denominate a suspect categ~ry.'~

B. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.: Moving Toward
Strict Scrutiny
When the next illegitimacy case reached the Supreme
Court, it was uncertain whether the Court would follow the Levy
and Glona approach of closely examining the state statute, or
adhere to the Labine approach of granting broad deference to
the state. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.POthe Supreme Court chose to follow Levyb1and distinguish Labine,"
but the appropriate equal protection standard for illegitimacy
remained uncertain. The Court in Weber invalidated the Louisiana workmen's compensation statuteb3 that discriminated
45. Id. at 550 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 557-58.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.307 (1976).
49. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
50. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
51. Id. at 168-69, 172.
52. Id. at 170-71.
53. LA. REV.STAT.ANN.$' 23:1021(3) (West 1964). This section defined "children" to
include "only legitimate children, stepchildren, posthumous children, adopted children,"
and acknowledged illegitimate children. Thus, unacknowledged illegitimate children
could only recover under workmen's compensation as "other dependents." Those quali-
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against illegitimate children who were seeking equal benefits
along with the legitimate children of their deceased father.
In distinguishing Weber from Labine, Justice Powell noted
that Labine "reflected . . . the traditional deference to a state's
prerogative to regulate the disposition at death of property
within its borders."64 Justice Powell reasoned that "the substantial state interest in providing for 'the stability . . . of land
titles' "66 justified the greater deference afforded the state in
La bine.
Justice Powell further distinguished Labine on the ground
that the deceased in Labine could have easily made a will providing an inheritance for the illegitimate child, whereas the deceased in Weber could not have legitimated the plaintiffs because of the requirement in Louisiana law that in order to
acknowledge an illegitimate child the father must have been capable of contracting marriage with the mother when the child
was conceived." In other words, it would have been relatively
easy for the illegitimate child in Labine to receive an inheritance, but in Weber it was legally impossible for the children to
receive any benefits of the compensation scheme. According to
Justice Powell's argument, stricter scrutiny should be applied to
statutes that place "insurmountable barriers" in the paths of illegitimate children seeking to receive equal treatment. Justice
Powell in a later opinion, however, seemed to reverse himself on
the insurmountable barrier doctrine and recognized that "[bly
focusing on the steps that an intestate might have taken to assure some inheritance for his illegitimate children, the analysis
loses sight of the essential question: the constitutionality of discrimination against illegitimates . . . ."67
Notwithstanding the difficulty in harmonizing the Labine
precedent, the Court in Weber did attempt a thorough doctrinal
analysis of the equal protection standard for illegitimacy. Justice
fying as "other dependents" received only the excess beyond the "children's" and surviving spouse's portions. LA.REV.STAT.ANN.5 23:1232(8) (West 1964). In Weber the illegitimate children recovered nothing since the benefits awarded to the legitimate children
and widow exhausted the funds allotted. 406 U.S. at 167.
54. 406 U.S. at 170.
55. Id. (quoting Labine v. Vincent, 229 So. 2d 449, 452 (La. Ct. App. 1969)).
56. LA. CIV. CODEANN. art. 204 (West 1952). When the illegitimate children in
Weber were born their father was legally married to a woman other than the children's
mother. Thus their parents were incapable of marriage when they were conceived. 406
U.S. a t 170-71.
57. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. a t 774.

-.
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Powell cited the leading cases that developed both the rational
basis test and the fundamental rights exception, and then declared: "The essential inquiry in all the foregoing cases is, however, inevitably a dual one: What legitimate state interest does
the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights
might the classification endanger?"68
Justice Powell's analysis in Weber simply incorporates both
tiers of the old two-tiered approach. An examination of state interests or objectives is the starting point of the two-tiered analysis. The second question in the Weber "two-fold" approach appears to represent the fundamental rights exception that the
courts have used for many years in other ~ontexts.~@
This emphasis on fundamental rights in the illegitimacy context is confusing since arguably no fundamental rights are infringed upon
by illegitimacy statutes. The Supreme Court has not recognized
a fundamental right to inherit in intestate succession, to sue
under wrongful death statutes, or to receive workmen's compensation or social security benefits. Nonetheless, these areas comprise the majority of alleged illegitimacy discrimination. These
are all areas where the "right" to receive the benefit of the statute-if it can be called a right-is created by legislation, and
such rights are commonly refused to those who do not qualify.
Hence, the Weber "two-fold approach" did not significantly
clarify the appropriate equal protection standard to be applied
in illegitimacy cases.
Following Weber, the Court struck down several statutory
schemes discriminating against illegitimates without explicitly
following Weber's two-fold inquiry. In Gomez u. Perez,'O the Supreme Court overruled a Texas Court of Appeals decision61that
granted legitimate children "a judicially enforceable right to
support from their natural father^,"^' but denied that same right
to illegitimate children. The per curiam opinion cited cases holding statutes unconstitutional for discrimination against illegitimates but ignored Labine, the one case upholding such a stat58. 406 U.S. at 173. The Weber approach is discussed in several commentaries. Wallach & Tenoso, supra note 36; Note, Equal Protection and the "Middle-Tier": The ImDAMELAW.303 (1978); Paternity Statutes,
pact on Women and Illegitimates, 54 NOTRE
supra note 3, at 348; 42 Mo. L. REV.444 (1977).
59. See note 22 supra.
60. 409 U S . 535 (1973).
61. Gomez v. Perez, 466 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971).
62. 409 U S . at 535.
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ute. A New Jersey financial assistance program63 encountered
The
the same fate in the 1973 case of New Jersey v. C~hill.~'
following year a portion of the Social Security Act6' requiring
illegitimate children to prove dependency in order to recover on
behalf of their disabled parent was declared unconstitutional. In
that case, Jimenez v. Weinberger,66the Court reasoned that the
law discriminated between classes of illegitimate children. For
illegitimate children in general the statute required proof of actual dependency prior to the father's disabling injury. Illegitimate children born after the injury obviously could not prove
that they had depended on their fathers prior to the injury. After-born illegitimate children could only qualify for benefits if
they were entitled to inherit under state intestacy law, were legitimated under state law, or were precluded from legitimate
status because of some formal defect in their parents' marriage." These requirements have nothing to do with dependency
and yet the aim of the statute was to aid dependent children,
therefore the law discriminated on criteria unrelated to its goal.
In other words, the Supreme Court invalidated the law because
some after-born illegitimates could receive benefits and some
could not, and the distinction had nothing to do with whether
they actually depended on the injured parent."
Following these cases Labine remained the only exception
to the trend that statutes discriminating against illegitimate
children would not withstand an equal protection challenge. The
end result was that even though the Supreme Court had never
expressly admitted it, illegitimacy was apparently being treated
as a suspect category.
C. Mathews v. Lucas: Is Illegitimacy a Suspect Category?

~ Supreme Court
Subsequently, in Mathews v. L u ~ a s , 'the
refused to in fact make illegitimacy a suspect category, even
though the lower court had d~ne.so.~O
The plaintiffs in Lucas
63. N.J. STAT.ANN. 8 4413 (West 1940) (replaced in 1977 by N.J. STAT.ANN. 8 4410
(West Supp. 1979-1980)).
64. 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
65. 42 U.S.C. 8 416(h)(3)(B) (1976).
66. 417 US. 628 (1974).
67. Id. at 635-36.
68. Id.
69. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
70. Id. at 504-06.
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challenged portions of the Social Security Act that required illegitimate children to prove actual dependency on a deceased parent in order to recover after-death support.71The plaintiffs were
illegitimate children of the deceased and could not prove dependency. The Court refused to condemn the established procedure
since it thought that "the statutory classifications challenged
here are justified as reasonable empirical judgements that are
consistent with a design to qualify entitlement to benefits upon
a child's dependency at the time of the parent's death."?' The
degree of scrutiny implied by this holding is certainly less than
strict scrutiny and more akin to rational basis deferen~e.?~
Weber's two-fold approach was not expressly followed. In refusing to declare illegitimacy a suspect category the Court did contend that its scrutiny of illegitimacy statutes would not be "a
toothless one."74
Justice Stevens' dissent noted that Mathews v. Lucas
presented essentially the same issue treated in Jimenez u. Weinberger, where the Court reached an opposite resultP6 As noted,
the problem of illegitimate children born after the parent becomes disabled was crucial in Jimenez. Obviously, where the
parent has died-as in Lucas-this problem does not exist. On
this ground the two cases are distinguishable. The end result,
however, is not satisfying. Certain illegitimate children of deceased parents cannot recover Social Security benefits, but similarly situated illegitimate children of disabled parents can. The
Court offered no clear justification for this distinction.

D. Trimble v. Gordon
Just one year after deciding Lucas, the Supreme Court decided Trimble v. Gordon. The Court made a detailed examination of the preceding illegitimacy cases in Trimble, and set forth
what many observers felt would finally become a consistent
standard for illegitimacy cases:
71. 42 U.S.C. 33 402(d)(l), (3), 416(2)(B), (3) (1976). See also 427 U.S. at 498-500,
nn.1-3.
72. 427 U.S. at 510.
73. One observer writes: "In Mathews u. Lucas, the'reasonable level of scrutiny utilized through the Weber balancing test provided the illegitimate with virtually no more
protection that [sic] a mere r~tionalbasis test would have provided." 42 Mo. L. REV.444,
451 (1977).
74. 427 U.S. at 510.
75. Id. at 516-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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"[Tlhis Court requires, a t a minimum, that a statutory classification bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose." In this context, the standard just stated is a minimum;
the Court sometimes requires more. "Though the latitude
given state economic and social regulation is necessarily broad,
when state statutory classifications approach sensitive and fundamental personal rights, this Court exercises a stricter scrutiny . . . ."
Appellants urge us to hold that classifications based on illegitimacy are "suspect," so that any justifications must survive "strict scrutiny." We considered and rejected a similar argument last Term in Mathews v. Lucas. As we recognized in
Lucas, illegitimacy is analogous in many respects to the personal characteristics that have been held to be suspect when
used as the basis of statutory differentiations. We nevertheless
concluded that the analogy was not sufficient to require "our
most exacting scrutiny." Despite the conclusion that classifications based on illegitimacy fall in a "realm of less than strictest
scrutiny," Lucas also establishes that the scrutiny "is not a
toothless one," a proposition clearly demonstrated by our previous decisions in this area.'%

In other words the Court followed this basic approach: although
illegitimacy is not a suspect category, any law that discriminates
against illegitimate children will receive a close judicial examination, something slightly less than strictest scrutiny, but still
"stricter scrutiny" than is given state laws dealing with most
other matters. Having thus defined the applicable standard of
review, the Court held unconstitutional an Illinois law77requiring that the parents of an illegitimate child marry before the
child could recover under the intestate succession act.

ISSUEIN
IV. THEILLEGITIMACY

THE

1978 TERM

A. Lalli v. Lalli
Although all the interested parties agreed that Robert Lalli
was the son of Mario Lalli,?8the Supreme Court ruled that Robert could not inherit from his father in intestate succession.
76. 430 U.S. at 766-67 (citations omitted) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505, 506, 510
(1976)).
77. Probate Act of 1975 $ 2-2, ILL. REV.STAT.ANN.ch. 3, $ 2-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1978) (original version at Probate Act of 1939 $ 12, 1939 Ill. Laws 8).
78. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Mario Lalli had not had his paternity declared by petitioning
the proper New York court for an order officially recognizing
that he was Robert's father? Robert claimed that this New
York state requirement discriminated against him as an illegitimate child in violation of the equal protection clause.80Robert's
argument appeared likely to prevail, considering the trend of the
Supreme Court from Levy v. Louisiana through Trimble v.
Gordon. Robert's argument, however, convinced only four of the
five justices who had joined in striking down the Illinois law in
Trimble.81 The fifth justice of the Trimble majority, Justice
Powell, joined the Trimble dissenterse2 and upheld the New
York statute. The Court reasoned that "a number of problems
arise that counsel against treating illegitimate children identically to all other heirs of an intestate father."8s These same
"problems" existed in Trimble, and arguably in other illegitimacy cases in which the challenged laws were struck down, but
in the previous cases the Court did not think that these
"problems" justified treating illegitimate children differently.
The Supreme Court's analysis in Lalli essentially followed
the traditional rational basis approach: "Our inquiry under the
Equal Protection Clause does not focus on the abstract 'fairness'
of a state law, but on whether the statute's relation to the state
interests it is intended to promote is so tenuous that it lacks the
rationality contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment."" The
Court concluded, using this "rationality" test, that the New
York proof of paternity requirement is "substantially related to
the important state interests the statute is intended to promote."85 This conclusion is difficult to reconcile with Trimble.
The statute in Trimble was "substantially related" to "important state interests." The flaw in Trimble was that the statute
did not consider less discriminatory approaches in dealing with
illegitimacy problems.88
Justice Powell wrote both the Trimble and Lalli opinions,
79. Id. at 262. See also note 12 supra.
80. 439 U.S. at 262.
81. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens formed the majority in
Trimble. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens dissented in Lalli.
82. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist were the
dipsenters in Trirnble, and along with Justice Powell formed the majority in Lalli.
83. 439 U.S. at 269.
84. Id. at 273.
85. Id. at 275-76.
86. 430 U.S. at 772.
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and he tried to distinguish Lalli on the ground that Trimble "effected a total statutory disinheritance of children born out of
wedlock who were not legitimated by the subsequent marriage of
their p a r e n t P 7 In Lalli, by contrast, the requirements for legitimating children did not necessitate the marriage of the parents
but only a court decree of paternity.88 As Justice Brennan's dissent persuasively pointed out, however, neither the marriage of
the parents nor a court order of paternity represents a requirement that many illegitimate children will be able to meet? In
any event, Justice Powell convinced only a plurality of the Court
that Trimble was distinguishable. Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion gave the fifth vote in favor of the judgment, but Justice
Blackmun disagreed with Justice Powell's reasoning and contended that the Court could not hold as it did without overruling Trimble.Bo The four dissenters felt Trimble was
indistinguishable.

B. Parham v. Hughes and Califano v. Boles
Other opinions in the 1978 Term give support to the observation that the standard in illegitimacy analysis is moving away
from the "stricter scrutiny" of Trimble toward greater deference
to the legislature. In Parharn u. Hughes,@'the Court upheld a
Georgia statuteBa that required a father to declare paternity
before the death of his illegitimate child in order to take advantage of Georgia's wrongful death statute. The dissent by Justice
White pointed out that the fact situation in Parham was fundamentally the same as that found in Glona, where the Louisiana
law was struck down.B3In upholding the Georgia statute, the
majority opinion correctly observed that the law did not discriminate directly against illegitimate children vis-a-vis legiti87. 439 U.S. at 273.
& TRUSTS
LAW8 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967). The New York law
88. N.Y. EST., POWERS
requires that the proceeding requesting the court order of filiation must commence during the pregnancy of the mother or within two years from the birth of the child. The
Supreme Court did not rule specifically on the constitutionality of this two-year limitation because the lower court had not reached the issue. 439 U.S. at 267 n.5. Consequently, all that Lalli specifically held was that requiring court decrees of paternity for
illegitimate children in intestate succession is not unconstitutional.
89. 439 U.S. at 278-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 276-77. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
91. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
92. GA. CODEANN. 8 105-1307 (1975).
93. 441 US. at 363 (White, J., dissenting).
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mate children, but actually discriminated between parents of illegitimate children and parents of legitimate children.@' This
same distinction was present in Glona, but Justice Douglas was
not deterred there from declaring the Louisiana statute unconstitutional. Justice Douglas found "no possible rational basis"@5
to support the law: "Where the claimant is plainly the mother,
the State denies equal protection of the laws to withhold relief
merely because the child, wrongfully killed, was born to her out
of wedlo~k."~
Glona and Parham can be distinguished by the
fact that it was the illegitimate child's mother trying to recover
in Glona, whereas the father brought the suit in Parham. The
Court, however, does not mention this distinction, and the
Parham opinion merely rests on the ground that the Court did
find that the statute was rationally related to a permissible state
objective.@'
In Califano v. Boles,@8the Supreme Court sustained the
portion of the Social Security Act that restricts mothers' insurance benefits to widows and divorced wives of wage earners."
The mother of an illegitimate child brought suit contending that
because she could not receive mothers' benefits, part of which
she would use for support of the child, the child was being discriminated against because of its illegitimacy. The Court responded that the child received direct benefits as a minor child
of the deceased,loOand declared incidental any effect on the
child from mothers' benefits.l0l Justice Marshall's dissent persuasively argued that the absence of mothers' benefits had much
more than an incidental effect on children.lo2Justice Marshall
also stressed that the majority opinion violated principles of
Weber and Jimenez- Weber because the Court had concluded
there that "marital status of parents is not a sufficiently accurate index of the economic needs of their children to warrant
conclusively denying assistance to illegitimate^,"^^^ and Jimenez
because "[t]he constitutional infirmities identified in Jimenez
94. 441 U.S. at 353.
95. 391 U.S. at 75.
96. Id. at 76.
97. 441 U.S. at 357-58.
98. 443 U.S. 282 (1979).
99. 42 U.S.C. 55 402 (g)(l), 416 (d)(3) (1976). See also 443 U.S. at 286 n.5.
100. 443 U.S. at 294.
101. Id. at 295.
102. Id. at 298-301 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 305.
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are equally evident in this case . . . ."lo4 These infirmities were
that the law aided legitimate children who were not in fact dependent on their deceased parent, and took away aid from illegitimate children who in fact had depended on their deceased
parent.lo5

The history of the illegitimacy cases presents a chain of
close decisions accompanied by frequent, vigorous dissents. On
the present Court, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart
and Rehnquist generally favor an analysis granting considerable
deference to illegitimacy statutes.loe Justices Brennan, White,
and Marshall lean toward a stricter scrutiny of illegitimacy statutes.lo7 Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens have changed
their positions during the course of the illegitimacy cases; the
more recent opinions indicate that Justice Stevens is leaning toward rational basis deference and Justice Blackmun toward
stricter scrutiny.lo8 This even division in the present Court
makes it difficult to predict what may occur in the future. Nonetheless, some basic conclusions can be drawn concerning the Supreme Court's approach to the question of equal protection for
illegitimates.
I t does not appear likely that illegitimacy will join race, national origin, and alienage as classifications receiving the Court's
On the other hand, illegitimacy statutes are
strictest scrutiny.lO@
not approved according to a mere rational basis standard; established precedent requires a stricter examination of illegitimacy
issues. Thus illegitimacy does not fit neatly or consistently into
either of the two tiers of the traditional approach. Sometimes an
illegitimacy statute is given deference as is done under the rational basis test, and sometimes it is more strictly scrutinized.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 305-06.
106. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 776-86
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Especially note Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in
Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979).
107. See Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. at 297-306 (Marshall, J., dissenting);Parham v.
Hughes, 441 U.S. at 361-68 (White, J., dissenting); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 277-79
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. Justice Stevens voted with the majority in Califano u. Boles and Parham u.
Hughes. Justice Blackmun dissented in these same cases.
109. See note 21 supra.
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What are the factors that determine which illegitimacy statutes
are strictly scrutinized and which are not?

A. Insurmountable Barriers
One factor present in several cases is the "insurmountable
barrier" doctrine. This doctrine inquires whether illegitimate
children are permanently barred from equal treatment or
whether only minor barriers must be overcome before achieving
equality with legitimate children. Justice Powell expressly disparaged insurmountable barriers as an analytical tool in Trimble
u. Gordon,llo and since the presence or absence of insurmountable barriers does not explain all the cases,"' insurmountable
barriers can only be part of the reconciliation of the illegitimacy
issue. However, in the recent case of Lalli u. Lalli, Justice
Powell seemed to again rely on the insurmountable barrier doctrine to distinguish Lalli from Trimble:
The Illinois statute in Trimble was constitutionally unacceptable because it effected a total statutory disinheritance of children born out of wedlock who were not legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their parents. The reach of the statute was
far in excess of its justifiable purposes. . . . [The New York
law] does not share this defect. . . This is not a requirement
that inevitably disqualifies an unnecessarily large number of
children born out of wedlock.""

.

Thus "insurmountable barriers," or the burden the illegitimate child must overcome to secure equal treatment, is but one
of the factors that determines how strict the scrutiny applied to
an illegitimacy statute will be. Another factor goes much further
in explaining and reconciling the illegitimacy cases: the presence
or absence of a moral purpose in the legislation.

B. Legislative Purpose: The Determinative Factor?
The starting point of analysis in the illegitimacy cases under
110. "Despite its appearance in two of our opinions, the focus on the presence or
absence of an insurmountable barrier is somewhat of an analytical anomaly." 430 US. at
773. See also notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra.
111. For example, the insurmountable barrier doctrine cannot explain the differences between Labine v. Vincent and Trimble u. Gordon: the barrier for the illegitimate
child was exactly the same in each case. Both cases involved intestate succession, and the
barrier to illegitimate children in the intestate succession laws would have been avoided
in each case by the making of a will, yet the holdings are opposite.
112. 439 U.S. at 273.
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the equal protection clause has generally been an examination of
the objective the statute purports to further: whether it seeks to
regulate the behavior of the parents by punishing the illegitimate child, or whether it seeks to facilitate an orderly distribution of a decedent's property or a just allocation of benefits
under family support programs. A review of the illegitimacy
cases with these possible objectives in mind reveals a definite
consistent pattern. In every case where the state objective in a
statute that discriminates against illegitimate children is primarily the promotion of moral behavior or the condemnation of
sexual activity outside of marriage, the statute has been declared
unconstitutional. On the other hand, if the state objective is
merely to provide for the equitable distribution of property or to
overcome problems of proof, the statute has been upheld. The
accuracy of this conclusion can be documented by analyzing the
nature of the governmental interest in illegitimacy statutes.
A review of the cases invalidating illegitimacy laws shows a
definite pattern. In Levy u. Louisiana, the state statute had
been declared by the state courts to be " 'based on morals and
general welfare because it discourages bringing children into the
world out of wedlock.' "119 In Glona v. American Guarantee &
Liability Insurance Co., the Supreme Court noted that " 'sin'
. . . is, we are told, the historic reason for the creation of the
disability."l14 The Court mentioned in Weber v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co. that "[tlhe Louisiana Supreme Court emphasized
strongly the state's interest in protecting 'legitimate family relationships' . . . ."ll6 In New Jersey v. Cahill, the state's objective
was " 'to preserve and strengthen family life.' "116 In Trimble v.
Gordon, one of the state's purported interests furthered by the
statute was " 'the promotion of [legitimate] family relationships.' "117 Hence, this almost unanimous pattern suggests that
113. 391 U.S. at 70 (quoting Levy v. State, 192 So. 2d 193, 195 (La. Ct. App. 1966)).
114. 391 U.S. at 75.
115. 406 U.S.at 173 (quoting Stokes v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 257 La. 424, 433, 242
So. 2d 567, 570 (1970)).
116. 411 U.S. at 620 (quoting New Jersey v. Cahill, 349 F. Supp. 491, 496 (D.N.J.
1972)).
117. 430 U.S. at 768 (quoting In re Estate of Karas, 61 111. 2d 40,48,329 N.E.2d 234,
238 (1975)). The other purpose for the statues was the state's interest in governing the
intestate succession of property. Id. a t 770. The Supreme Court concluded that the statute did not meet this goal because it was too broad; the statute excluded some illegitimate children unnecessarily. Id. a t 770-72. Thus, encouraging morality was not the sole
purpose for the statute in Trimble. However, Justice Powell emphasized the presence of
the "moral" purpose in Trimble when he distinguished Lalli from Trimble. 439 U.S. at
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if the statute's primary objective in discriminating against illegitimate~is merely to encourage morality or discourage promiscuity, the statute will be declared unconstitutional.
The pattern in cases upholding illegitimacy legislation is
just as clear. Although strengthening family life was briefly mentioned as a possible state objective for the statute in Labine u.
Vincent, the Court's holding actually rests on the state's power
"to make laws for distribution of property left within the
State."l18 In Mathews v. Lucas, the Court upheld a statute that
discriminated against illegitimate children, but the Court determined that the governmental objective was "to provide for all
children of deceased insureds who can demonstrate their 'need'
in terms of dependency at the times of the insureds' deaths."l19
Any mention of punishing sin or encouraging legitimate family
relationships was conspicuously absent in Lucas. Similarly, the
Supreme Court declared in Lalli v. Lalli: "[Tlhe primary state
goal underlying the challenged aspects of 5 4-1.2 is to provide for
the just and orderly disposition of property at death."120 The
lack of any state purpose designed to encourage moral behavior
is one of the facts the Court accented in distinguishing Lalli
from Trimble:
The Illinois law [in Trimble] was defended, in part as a means
of encouraging family relationships. No such justification has
been offered in support of 5 4-1.2. The Court of Appeals disclaimed that the purpose of the statute, "even in small part,
was to discourage illegitimacy, to mold human conduct or to
set societal norms."181

In no case upholding a statute permitting discrimination against
illegitimate children has the state's principal aim been a moral
l ~ these
~
cases the
condemnation of the parents' illicit ~ 0 n d u c t . In
267-68.
Many statutes do have multiple aims. The point here, however, is that if one of the
state's objectives is to minimize promiscuity by treating illegitimates differently, then
the statute will probably be strictly scrutinized.
118. 401 U.S. at 539.
119. 427 U.S. a t 507.
120. 439 U.S. at 268.
121. Id. a t 267-68 (quoting In re Lalli, 43 N.Y.2d. 65, 70, 371 N.E.2d 481, 483, 400
N.Y.S.2d 761, 764 (1977)).
122. The Court in Parham u. Hughes upheld a statute whose objective was to encourage legitimate family relations, 441 U.S. at 350, but that case does not weaken the
stated conclusion. The statute in Parham did not punish illegitimate children for the
infidelity of their parents; rather it only denied fathers of illegitimate children the right
to sue for the wrongul death of their child. The Court declared: "It is thus neither illogi-
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Court usually emphasizes the nonmoral, property, or administrative purposes of the statute.
What does this conclusion mean for the illegitimacy problem in particular, and also for the broader issue of equal protection analysis? First, Justice Blackmun's assertion in his concurring opinion in Lalli that the courts had not given guidance to
the states, and that each law will have to be judicially determined to be on either the Lalli or the Trimble side of the line123
was not entirely accurate. Justice Blackmun was correct in stating that the courts have not given the states explicit guidance,
but the pattern of history tells drafters of state or federal statutes that illegitimates can only be treated differently vis-a-vis
legitimate children for purposes unrelated to the moral objective
of discouraging illicit sexual behavior. Possible proper motives
have been previously suggested.
This is not to suggest that a statute whose real purpose is to
discriminate against illegitimate children for moral reasons will
be upheld under the guise of a stated "proper" purpose. The
courts will undoubtedly see through such a sham and deal with
the real purpose. The government will have the burden of demonstrating a legitimate objective unrelated to the morality of the
parents. If the government is successful in carrying its burden,
the statute will be afforded some deference, rather than being
subjected to strict scrutiny.
In addition to giving some guidance for future cases, the observation that the nature of the state objective is determinative
in illegitimacy cases also lends insight into the present Supreme
Court approach to equal protection. It was noted earlier that
some observers contend that the Court is applying a type of balancing test in equal protection cases. It is beyond the scope of
this Comment to study in depth the merits and functions of
such a balancing test; however, some general observations based
on the limited scope of the illegitimacy cases can be offered.
Too often the issue of what constitutional standard is used
is resolved merely by stating that a balancing test or a sliding
scde is used. These labels are of limited value. To tell a legislative drafting committee or a client that the Court applies a sliding scale approach will not significantly aid the committee in decal nor unjust for society to express its 'condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond
the bonds of marriage' by not conferring upon a biological father the statutory right to
sue for the wrongful death of this illegitimate child." Id. at 353.
123. See 439 US. at 277 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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ciding how to draft a statute or the client in deciding whether to
incur the expense of contesting an alleged discriminatory practice. Interested parties need to know the controlling principles
likely to influence the Court's decision in order to assess their
reasonable chances of success. This information depends on
what factors the Court weighs in its balancing test or what slides
the scale in the sliding scale approach.
In the illegitimacy area the nature of the legislative objective appears to be the determining factor in the Court's balancing test. Despite the cogency of this conclusion, it remains tentative since it was formulated from a case-by-case comparison of
the Court's holdings, and cannot presently be grounded in the
express declarations of the Supreme Court. Thus, if the Supreme Court intends to continue using a balancing test in illegitimacy cases or in other areas, and desires to clarify the current
state of the law, the Court must specify what particular factors
will predominate in the balancing process.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has vacillated in its approach to the
problem of equal protection for illegitimate children. In some
cases, laws discriminating against illegitimate children have been
strictly scrutinized. In other cases, somewhat similar laws have
been treated with greater deference. The present Court's even
division on this issue makes the future of the illegitimacy issue
uncertain. The analytical approach of the Court is characterized
by the lack of a strict rule: the Court weighs the competing interests and applies differing degrees of judicial scrutiny in different cases. The factor that apparently triggers stricter scrutiny is
whether the challenged statute attempts to condemn the practice of having illegitimate children by discriminating against the
child. The Supreme Court has declared: "[Ilt is unjust and ineffective for society to express its condemnation of procreation
outside the marital relationship by punishing the illegitimate
child who is in no way responsible for his situation and is unable
to change it."124 On the other hand, if a statute's primary purpose in discriminating against illegitimate children is unrelated
to moral condemnation of illegitimacy, the statute will likely
124. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 352.
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survive an equal protection challenge.
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